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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GENERAL
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND MUNICIPAL LAW
IV. SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The State
a) Universal jurisdiction for international crimes
STS 705/2007 of 18 July. Criminal jurisdiction. Appeal in Cassation 329/2007
Plea to the jurisdiction
Appeal in cassation for breach of the Law and breach of a constitutional precept, 
against a decree handed down by the Criminal Chamber of the National High Court 
(Section 3) dated 20 December 2006.
“I. Background
(. . .)
TWO. The Decree stated as follows: “IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS 
CHAMBER: To uphold the plea to the jurisdiction entered as a peremptory 
plea by the defence of the prisoner Eusebio in favour of the competent criminal 
court of the Republic of Argentina (Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Cor-
reccional Federal number 12 of the Federal Capital), to which the examination 
of the acts and offences for which he has been arraigned here in Case 19/97 
of Central Court of Instruction number 5 (Chamber Roll 139/97) is therefore 
ceded; let this decision serve as a formal accusation before the authorities of 
the Argentine Republic as provided in article 42 of the Treaty on Extradition 
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and Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Argentine Republic of 4 March 1978 (RCL 1990, 1478), which shall be 
fi led through diplomatic channels as provided in article 41 of the said Treaty 
but shall also be communicated by facsimile through the INTERPOL Service 
and through the Argentine Embassy in Spain.
Eusebio shall continue to be remanded in custody in connection with this 




ONE. The operative part of the Decision here at issue decrees that examina-
tion of the acts and offences giving rise to the prosecution of Eusebio in Case 
19/97 of Central Court of Instruction no. 5 be ceded to the competent criminal 
court in the Argentine Republic, by way of the formal accusation procedure set 
out in articles 41 and 42 of the Treaty on Extradition and Judicial Assistance 
in Criminal Matters between the Kingdom of Spain and the Argentine Republic 
of 4 March 1978 (RCL 1990, 1478), as a result of the upholding of the plea to 
the jurisdiction entered by the prisoner’s defence as a peremptory plea in the 
proceedings prior to the hearing.
Section Three of the Criminal Division of the National High Court founds 
its decision on the fact that there are various criminal investigations pending 
in the Argentine courts in connection with the same events in which Carlos 
Manuel was allegedly implicated as are at issue here and hence takes the view 
that such investigations take priority over the Spanish jurisdiction for purposes 
of trying these alleged offences.
After asserting that the Spanish courts undoubtedly have jurisdiction to 
examine these proceedings, in application of the principle of Universal Justice 
enshrined in article 23.4 of the Judiciary Act (RCL 1985, 1578, 2635), and in 
particular sections a), b) and h), and that the National High Court is competent 
according to article 65 of the same Act, all of which further coincides with 
the doctrine handed down in this respect by the Constitutional Court and by 
this same Chamber, subject to no limitation other than the possibility of res 
judicata in the event of a prior acquittal, a sentence duly completed or a pardon 
in another country (STC of 26 September 2005 [RJ 2005, 7405]), despite all 
the foregoing the Judges a quibus conclude that the peremptory plea made by 
the prisoner’s defence ought to be upheld on the grounds that this is a case 
of “concurring jurisdictions” (sic), to the extent that there is in fact a genuine 
“confl ict of jurisdiction” (sic) given the existence of litis pendens in that actions 
are simultaneously in progress in the Argentine Republic, listed in the Decree 
here at issue, and in our own country, all concerning the same events, in which 
Eusebio was allegedly a part.
In the opinion of the Court a quo, this confl ict of jurisdiction must be settled 
in favour of the Argentine judicial authorities, since the forum of the locus 
delicti should have priority as a general criterion for the assignment of com-
petence, and the Spanish jurisdiction must therefore stand down in obedience 
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to the axioms of Universal Justice or Prosecution enshrined in the above-cited 
precepts of Spanish internal law.
TWO. This line of argument is challenged by the public, private and popular 
prosecutions appearing in the case, who have brought respective appeals on dif-
fering grounds, but all coinciding in their principal aim, which is – other merely 
accessory considerations aside – that the defence’s plea to the jurisdiction be 
denied and that the hearing proceed.
Having examined the reasons set out in these appeals, and most particularly 
those contained in the well-reasoned and telling submission from the Public 
Prosecution Service, we feel bound to uphold them in essence in view of the 
following infringements in the application of the Law (art. 849.1 LECrim [LEG 
1882, 16]) which have indubitably been committed in the challenged decree:
1) Firstly, there is improper application of article 666 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, which regulates the formulation and content of peremptory pleas, in this 
case as it relates to articles 19, 25, 26 and 45 of the same Act, and to articles 
9, 21, 23.4, 38, 39, 42 and 65 of the Judiciary Act (RCL 1985, 1578, 2635).
That is, when article 666 of the Procedure Act considers the different cir-
cumstances that may legitimately be the object of peremptory pleas prior to the 
Ordinary Proceedings, and in particular when it includes pleas to the jurisdic-
tion among these (section 1), it by no means refers to anything that could be 
described as an “international confl ict of jurisdiction”, but to possible collisions 
of internal law of the kind that can arise between the different jurisdictional 
orders or between the courts and the Administration, for the settlement of which 
the law also provides special Chambers in case the upholding of a plea to the 
jurisdiction should cause a negative confl ict at a later date.
Here, there is strictly speaking no question of “declining” jurisdiction, since 
a confl ict of competence with courts in another State could never arise out of 
a decision by a Spanish court, as this Chamber stated in its Judgment of 25 
February 2003 (RJ 2003, 2147), nor is there any body whose mission is to settle 
the issue should one arise, and nor again is it conceivable that the National 
High Court, or this Court in appeal, should unilaterally decide to hand over to 
another country the jurisdiction necessary to examine a case regarding which, 
in accordance with the legal rules that have been infringed here, it has already 
been determined that jurisdiction lies with our national courts since there is no 
rule that authorises a Spanish court to hand over the right of jurisdiction to a 
foreign State.
In short, the manner in which the court a quo has applied article 666 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act and concordant legislation cannot be accepted in that 
it oversteps the bounds of the rules governing these issues, which under no 
circumstances may refer to an alleged international “confl ict of jurisdiction”.
2) Secondly, the Passive Extradition Act (Law 4/1985 of 21 March [RCL
1985, 697, 867]) has also been improperly applied, especially as regards articles 
2, 3, 4, 6, 7 et seq. and 18, and likewise the Treaty on Extradition and Judi-
cial Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Argentine Republic signed on 3 March 1987 and ratifi ed by Instrument of 26 
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February 1990, with regard essentially to articles 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 41 and 
42 thereof.
It is obvious that in its decision the court a quo improperly applied the 
generic regulation contained in the cited Treaty with Argentina, which deals in 
the course of the Treaty with mutual judicial assistance, and whose provisions – 
in which the institution of extradition is naturally central – leave no possible 
room for the Decree here at issue, and likewise the particular provision contained 
in article 42, which is expressly cited in the High Court’s Decree, including 
the operative part, which alludes to the “. . . accusation brought by a contracting 
party for the purpose of initiating an action in the Courts of the other party . . .”, 
which is obviously not the case seeing that the High Court itself seeks to jus-
tify its decision by alluding to already-existing actions in which Carlos Manuel 
could be implicated.
Furthermore, it is silent on compliance with the legal rules governing extra-
dition, which is the procedure envisaged both in the Treaty and in our Laws 
for transferring a person to another country for trial at the place of destination, 
for the simple reason that when the Decree here at issue was handed down, 
the Argentine authorities had not yet made any request to Spain for extradition 
(although they apparently have done so now).
The decree thus displays a defi cient understanding both of our internal laws 
and of conventional law between States; it seeks to obviate the established chan-
nels for extradition, thus constituting a serious breach of rules in that respect, 
and particularly regarding the competences that these vouchsafe to the Govern-
ment of our country in these matters (see arts. 6 para. 2 and 18.1 Law 4/1985 
of 21 March), and likewise ignores the requirement that the court examine and 
verify whether the requisite conditions are met and that none of the obstacles 
established for authorisation of the transfer of the accused arise (arts. 1 and 3 
et seq. of the cited Law).
3) And fi nally, a further legal infringement is committed in failing to properly
apply article 18 of the Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in criminal 
matters between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of Mexico of 
21 November 1978 (RCL 1980, 1346), whereunder the express consent of the 
Mexican authorities is mandatory before a person who has been extradited from 
that country to this can be re-extradited to a third country.
There is no doubt that in practice the decision of the High Court is actu-
ally equivalent in its effects to an extradition, and in that respect the Mexican 
authorities, who originally granted the transfer of Carlos Manuel from that 
country, where he was, to this country which requested his extradition to put 
him on trial, would be defrauded of their right, as expressly defi ned in the 
cited bilateral Treaty (art. 18), to authorise the re-extradition of the extradited 
person to a third country, since they were neither consulted beforehand nor 
gave their consent.
The article cited provides that “. . . re-extradition in favour of a third State 
shall not be granted without the consent of the Party that granted the extradi-
tion”. Therefore, the Decree here at issue would breach both the letter and the 
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spirit of the article, which is fully in force in our internal law (“ex” art. 96.1 
CE [RCL 1978, 2836]).
In short, we conclude that the Decree here at issue, in following an inap-
propriate procedure, namely in upholding a plea to the jurisdiction incorrectly 
formulated as a peremptory plea under article 666 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act (LEG 1882, 16), is in fact tantamount to ordering the extradition of a pris-
oner who had already been arraigned for trial in which the Spanish courts were 
competent, absent any prior request for extradition or any attempt to determine 
whether the legal requirements therefore had been met, pre-empts the right of 
the Executive to decide on this matter and further breaches the provisions of 
the Treaties concluded by our country with the Argentine Republic and with the 
United States of Mexico, and therefore it must be set aside following the admis-
sion of the appeals brought against it.”
b) Extraterritorial penal jurisdiction of the State
STS of 27 December 2007. Criminal jurisdiction. Appeal in Cassation 1164/ 
2007
Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
Appeal in cassation for infringement of the law and a Constitutional provision 
and breach of form, brought by the Public Prosecution Service against a judgment 
handed down by the Provincial High Court of Granada, Section Two. 
“II. Legal Grounds
ONE. Section Two of the Provincial High Court of Granada pronounced 
judgment (JUR 2007, 282737) in these proceedings, the operative part of which 
declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to judge events concerning which 
two persons had been accused of an offence under art. 318 bis, having alleg-
edly been in charge of a boat with sixty-fi ve immigrants on board who were 
attempting to reach Spain from the African coast and were intercepted 42.5 
miles from the town of Adra in the province of Almería. The Public Prosecu-
tion Service lodged an appeal against the Provincial High Court’s decision in 
the opposite sense, citing previous decisions on similar matters, according to 
which the appeal against the decree here at issue should be upheld and the 
challenged decree set aside. 
The Court of Instance founded its decision on the view that the rule laid 
down in art. 23.4 of the LOPJ (RCL 1985, 1578, 2635), which establishes the 
principle of universal jurisdiction for certain crimes in our law, is not applicable 
to the case, and nor are the principles of territoriality and personality.
In STS 198/2007 of 8 October we said, and here we repeat:
“The Public Prosecution Service states that ‘illegal immigration is one of 
the most serious problems facing our country at this time’ and that ‘it does 
not seem right that Spain should have no jurisdiction in relation to the pilots 
in charge of boats sailing to our country’; and in this connection it goes on 
to say that in its opinion the court at instance failed to give due heed to the 
Protocol against illegal traffi cking of migrants by land, sea or air (RCL 2003, 
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2864) and art. 110 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (RCL 1997, 345), which provides for a right to visit, inter alia, in the case 
of vessels possessing no nationality (as is normally the case with pateras or 
cayucos), given that failure to act in such cases would allow such conduct to 
continue with impunity.
The offence against the rights of foreigners regulated in article 318 bis, 
sections 1 and 3 of the Penal Code (RCL 1995, 3170 and RCL 1996, 777) 
art.318.bi.1 art.318.bi.3, of which the Public Prosecution Service accuses the 
defendants in this cause and for which it proposes seven years’ imprisonment, 
is merely an offence of action consisting in the commission of acts tending to 
promote, encourage or facilitate illegal traffi cking or clandestine immigration 
of persons “from, in transit through or to Spain”. Such conduct is thus defi ned 
progressively: promotion, being equivalent to provoking, inciting or procuring 
its commission; encouraging, meaning any act of assistance or support for 
illegal traffi cking; and facilitating, consisting in the removal of obstacles or the 
furnishing of means to enable traffi cking, which is in the fi nal analysis simply 
a kind of encouragement. We might say that any act committed at the outset 
or during the cycle of emigration or immigration which helps to achieve the 
purpose illegally is included in the defi nition of such conduct.
But in any case, given the range of activities that the penal category embraces, 
promoting, encouraging or facilitating clandestine immigration by any means 
is suffi cient for the offence to have been committed; and hence it is suffi cient 
for the offender to take part in any of the numerous tasks involved in such 
operations to meet the defi nition of the law, which can therefore include such 
acts as fi nancing of the operation, acting as go-between, carrier or navigator, or 
facilitating such acts. This means that it is immaterial whether the immigrants 
reach the Peninsula or the islands or the operation is frustrated by the action 
of the judicial police or by shipwreck, inasmuch as the offence is consummated 
by acts tending to promote, encourage or facilitate it, and the immigrants do 
not necessarily have to reach Spanish territory clandestinely (see SSTS of 5 
February 1998 [RJ 1998, 424] and 16 July 2002 [RJ 2002, 7668]).
It is also important to note that the legal good protected by article 318 bis 
of the Penal Code (RCL 1995, 3170 and RCL 1996, 777) is composed of two 
kinds of interest: the general interest in controlling migratory fl ows and prevent-
ing their being exploited by Mafi a-style criminal organisations, and the mediate 
interest in protecting the freedom, security, dignity and rights of emigrants.
At this point we must turn to the problem regarding what jurisdiction is 
competent to deal with actions of this kind when they are discovered and inter-
rupted in international waters. And in this respect it must be said that we do 
not believe that the court of instance had adequate grounds for concluding that 
the Spanish jurisdiction could not legitimately do so.
That is, if the exercise of criminal jurisdiction is a manifestation of the 
State’s sovereignty in accordance with the principle of territoriality, then each 
State is in principle entitled to examine any criminal act committed in its ter-
ritory, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator of the offence or of the 
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protected legal good (see art. 23.1 LOPJ [RCL 1985, 1578, 2635] and arts 14 
and 15 LECrim [LEG 1882, 16].).
Nevertheless, the principle of territoriality coexists with other principles 
which serve to defi ne the scope and boundaries of Spanish jurisdiction: a) the 
registration principle, or the fl ag principle, which supplements the former to 
cover ships and aircraft; and b) the real or protection of interests principle, 
whose purpose is to protect legal goods proper to the State regardless of where 
they are attacked.
These principles are based on the national interest of the legal good harmed 
by the offence, whether this is perpetrated in its territory or beyond its borders. 
In obedience to this principle, art. 23.3 LOPJ provides that Spanish courts shall 
deal with acts committed by Spaniards or foreigners outside Spanish territory 
where these are susceptible of being classifi ed as one of the offences listed in 
the cited article (which do not include offences against the rights of foreign 
citizens).
Along with the territoriality principle and the real principle or principle of 
protection of Spanish interests, the scope of the jurisdiction of the Spanish 
courts is also determined by the principle of personality or nationality, which 
determines that any citizen is always subject to the jurisdiction of his own 
country. For instance, Spain’s criminal jurisdiction is competent in respect 
of acts classifi ed as offences in Spanish criminal law even if they have been 
committed outside the national territory, as long as those criminally responsible 
are Spaniards or foreigners who have acquired Spanish nationality since the 
commission of the offence, and provided that the following conditions are met: 
1) that the offence be punishable in the place where it was committed, unless
such a condition is unnecessary thanks to an international treaty or a rule of
an international organisation of which Spain is part; 2) that the victim or the
Public Prosecution Service present an accusation or bring an action in the
Spanish courts; and 3) that the offender not have been acquitted, pardoned or
sentenced in a foreign country, or in this last case that he not have served the
sentence. If he should only have served part of the sentence, this will be taken
into account and whatever sentence is pronounced will be reduced accordingly
(see art. 23.2 LOPJ [RCL 1985, 1578, 2635] as amended by LO 11/1999 of
30/4 [RCL 1999, 1115]).
The principle of universality or world-wide justice also extends the scope of 
Spanish jurisdiction inasmuch as it serves to protect goods that are essential to 
humanity, as recognised by all civilised nations, regardless of the nationality 
of the offenders and the place of commission, essentially as regards the judg-
ing of truly international crimes. This principle is addressed by art. 23.4 LOPJ 
(RCL 1985, 1578, 2635) inasmuch as it declares the Spanish courts competent 
to deal with acts committed by Spaniards or foreigners outside the national ter-
ritory where these may be classifi ed under Spanish law as any of the following 
offences: a) Genocide; b) Terrorism; c) Piracy and illegal seizure of aircraft; 
d) Forging of foreign currency; e) Offences in connection with prostitution and
corruption of minors or incompetent persons (as amended by LO 11/1999 of
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30/4, which introduced the offences of corruption of minors or incompetent per-
sons); f) Illegal traffi cking in psychotropic, toxic or narcotic drugs; g) Offences 
of female mutilation (according to LO 3/2005 [RCL 2005, 1470], in force since 
10 July 2005); and h) Any other offence that can be prosecuted in Spain under 
international treaties or conventions.
The scope of Spanish jurisdiction cannot be fully defi ned without reference 
to the so-called principle of supplementary justice, also known as the principle 
of penal law through representation, which comes into play when there is no 
request for or grant of extradition, allowing the State where the offender is to 
try him under its criminal law. This principle is underpinned by the progres-
sive harmonisation of the different national legislations as a consequence of the 
similarity in structure of international treaties, inasmuch as they defi ne catego-
ries of offences and normally oblige the States to place them on their statute 
books. The incorporation of such categories of offences into the internal Law 
thus makes it possible to apply the aut dedere auto iudicare rule if necessary 
in the event that extradition is not granted.
Therefore, while it is true that the principle of territoriality is the chief crite-
rion – as is natural given its correlation with sovereignty – it is not an absolute 
principle, and there is a consensus in accepting the ‘real’ criterion or criterion 
of protecting State and national interests; whereas the principle of universality 
is only justifi ed insofar as it has its base in a pre-existing international legal-
ity, either conventional or customary. And fi nally, the residual criterion of 
the principle of supplementary justice, one of those defi ning the limits of the 
State’s jurisdiction, is intended to prevent an act that is considered criminal 
from going unpunished, considering – as we have said – that the community 
tends to view the same kinds of acts as criminal in the context of certain fi elds 
of general interest.
Turning now to the case at issue here, we must bear in mind that: 1/ Illegal 
immigration nowadays is one of the most pressing problems facing the Inter-
national Community, and one that is generally closely tied to what is known 
as Transnational Organised Crime, and as such it has been the subject of inter-
national agreements and conventions such as the Convention of 15 November 
2000 (RCL 2000, 2326) (ratifi ed by Spain via Instrument of 21 February 2002, 
BOE 10/12/2003 [RCL 2003, 2864]), along with the “Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air” supplementing that Convention, 
whose purpose is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational 
organized crime more effectively” (see art. 1 of the Convention).
TWO. The above-cited Protocol (RCL 2003, 2864) provides that “States 
Parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the 
smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the international law of the 
sea” (see art. 7) and determines that “A State Party that has reasonable grounds 
to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is 
without nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may 
board and search the vessel. If evidence confi rming the suspicion is found, that 
State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant domestic 
and international law” (see art. 8.7).
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THREE. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at 
Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 (BOE, 14 February 1997, no. 39/1997 
[RCL 1997, 345]), provides that “The high seas are open to all States, whether 
coastal or land-locked” and “Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the 
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law” 
(see art. 87.1), and further provides that “Every State shall fi x the conditions for 
the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, 
and for the right to fl y its fl ag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
fl ag they are entitled to fl y. There must exist a genuine link between the State 
and the ship” (see art. 91.1).
FOUR. The Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 (BOE, 27 December 1971 
[RCL 1971, 2306], no. 309/1971) states that “The term ‘high seas’ means all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal 
waters of a State” (see art. 1) and declares that “The high seas being open 
to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its 
sovereignty” (see art. 2). “Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to 
sail ships under its fl ag on the high seas” (see art. 4). And it further provides 
that “Every coastal State shall promote the establishment and maintenance of 
an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and 
over the sea” (see art. 12.2).
From the foregoing it follows that: a) it is acknowledged that States have the 
right to sail the high seas freely and that this is to be done in conditions laid 
down by international conventions and other rules of international law; b) one 
of these conditions or requirements is that vessels must possess the national-
ity of the fl ag that they are authorised to fl y, and are subject in principle to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of that State (“A ship which sails under the fl ags of 
two or more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any 
of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality” (see art. 92.2 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Se, done at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982 
[RCL 1997, 345]).
The present case concerns a vessel without nationality (as is normally the 
case with the pateras and cayucos used for illegal activities of this kind). Sail-
ing in vessels of this kind is really dangerous for the persons using them. In 
this case the Public Prosecution Service accused the persons presumably in 
charge of the unsuccessful operation of an offence under art. 318 bis sections 
1 and 3 of the Penal Code (RCL 1995, 3170 and RCL 1996, 777) art. 318.
bi.1 art. 318.bi.3, on the grounds that the lives of the occupants of the cayuco 
were seriously at risk given that they lacked either means of communicating 
with the outside world or life jackets (the media not infrequently carry reports 
of people losing their lives in operations of this kind), so that a vessel of the 
Spanish Marine Rescue Service had to rescue the immigrants and take them to 
the Spanish coast. As a result, the persons presumably in charge of this illegal 
immigration operation were landed on Spanish territory, which is undoubtedly 
where the arrested cayuco was headed.
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It is patently obvious that this was a case of organised illegal immigration for 
the purpose of clandestinely entering Spanish territory. Such conduct is a seri-
ous offence carrying a penalty of six to eight years’ imprisonment (see art. 318 
bis 1º and 3º CP; art. 318.bi.1 art. 318.bi.3 and art 2.b) of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 15 November 2000 (RCL 
2000, 2326)). The vessel used had no nationality. There is no record of any 
State claiming knowledge of this fact. The persons presumably in charge – or at 
least some of them (those travelling in the cayuco) – were in national territory. 
In any case there is a clear nexus between the event that this case concerns and 
our national interests. In the present case, then, there is a set of circumstances 
which according to the rules and principles of international law cited above – 
particularly art. 23.4 h) LOPJ (RCL 1985, 1578, 2635), art. 23.4 art. 23.h as 
they relate to art. 8.7 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air transcribed above (RCL 2003, 2864) – cover this jurisdic-
tional attribution, allow for the adoption of measures under the internal law, 
including the drafting of a report by the Security Forces, and more than justify 
the competence of the Spanish courts to try the present case.
It is therefore our duty to uphold the ground for cassation submitted by the 
Public Prosecution Service, and consequently also to set aside the challenged 
judgment (JUR 2007, 282737) and remit the proceedings to the Court from 
whence they came for it to pronounce the appropriate judgment on the criminal 
actions brought in this case by the Public Prosecution Service.
III. Finding
WE FIND IN FAVOUR OF THE APPEAL IN CASSATION for infringement
of the Law and a provision of the Constitution and breach of form brought by 
the Public Prosecution Service against the judgment delivered on 16 February 
two thousand and seven (JUR 2007, 282737) by the Provincial High Court of 
Granada in proceedings against Ivan and Cesar for an offence against the rights 
of foreign citizens, which we hereby quash and set aside. The court awards 
costs ex offi cio.
We therefore declare that the events related in the accusation fall within 
Spanish jurisdiction; let the proceedings be remitted to the Court from whence 
they came so that the same Court that delivered the appealed judgment, which 
we hereby set aside, can pronounce a new judgment on the pleas submitted 
by the Public Prosecution Service in its fi nal conclusions. Let this decision be 
conveyed to the cited Court for the appropriate legal purposes and the proceed-
ings be remitted to it.
This our judgment, which shall be published in the Legislative Collection, 
we hereby pronounce, order and sign. Andrés Martínez Arrieta. José Ramón 
Soriano Soriano. Juan Ramón Berdugo Gómez de la Torre”.
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2. International Organisation
a) Regime for workers in the service of an international organisation
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the Region of Madrid of 7 November. N. 
741/2007. Social jurisdiction. Appeal for Reversal 2992/2007
“Pleas of Fact
ONE: The record shows that the plaintiff brought a complaint against the 
defendant, the examination and judgment of which fell by rota to the cited 
Social Court, which delivered the above-cited judgment after conducting the 
appropriate procedural formalities and hearings, in which the respective positions 
of the parties were clearly set out.
TWO: In that decision, against which an appeal for reversal has been fi led, 
the following facts were expressly declared to have been proven:
1. The plaintiff, Lourdes, worked as a cleaning lady (the category appearing
on the pay slips, docs 4 et seq. complaint) for the defendant organisation, CON-
SEJO OLEICOLA INTERNACIONAL (COI), earning a basic salary of 731.68 
euros (according to the cited pay slips) from 1/3/1993 until 31/12/2005, when 
she was discharged with a severance payment, including one month’s salary in 
full settlement and compensation, of 14,084.84 euros, seemingly on the basis 
of 45 days per year of service (doc. 1 complaint).
(. . .)
4. The plaintiff duly applied for unemployment benefi t on 10/1/2006, and the
defendant Public Service advised her on 30/1/2006 that as she was not registered 
or in a situation assimilable thereto, nor did she qualify as a special case for 
receipt of such benefi t, that benefi t was refused (administrative decision attached 
to the complaint and accepted as reproduced). And indeed, as the record confi rms, 
the plaintiff was not affi liated to or registered with any social security scheme 
and did not pay contributions thereto during her time of service.
5. The plaintiff fi led a preliminary claim, which was rejected by decision of
23/3/2006 (docs 11 and 12, annexed to the complaint).
6. The plaintiff brought an action with the Social Courts in defence of her
right to Social Security affi liation. The Court declared itself incompetent and 
declined jurisdiction in favour of the Contentious Administrative Courts (Order 
of 28/4/2006 by Social Court 36 of Madrid, annexed to the record), and for 
that reason a deferment of the proceedings was requested until such time as 
the Contentious Administrative Court should decide on this situation. The Court 
denied this request, and the record of proceedings does not show that any con-
tentious administrative order has been forthcoming to date.
(. . .)
THREE: The judgment whose reversal is sought dismissed the complaint 
brought by the plaintiff.
FOUR: The plaintiff announced an appeal for reversal against that judgment, 




SOLE GROUND. The ground on which the plaintiff bases her appeal is 
covered by art. 191.c) of the LPL and concerns the infringement of Royal 
Decrees 2.805/1.979 of 7 December, 1.658/1.998 of 24 July and 317/1.985 of 
6 February, and likewise the Headquarters Agreement between Spain and the 
defendant organisation, the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 “and other 
Decisions of the Directorate-General for Social Action, of the Directorate-General 
of Social Insurance and ILO Convention No 67”.
Despite the evident vagueness of the cited norms – the applicable provisions 
of which are not cited – art. 33.3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions of 18 April 1967, ratifi ed by Spain on 21 November of the same year, 
clearly provides that a Diplomatic Agent who employs persons to whom the 
preceding section – dealing with “private servants” of the actual Agent – does 
not apply “shall observe the obligations which the social security provisions of 
the receiving State impose upon employers”.
Also, art. 41 of the same Convention – which connects with arts 1.g and 38.2 
in respect of members of the service staff – provides that “without prejudice to 
their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privi-
leges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State”, 
as alluded to in the written reply of 22/09/2006 given by the Under-secretary 
for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry to a question put 
by the plaintiff’s counsel (document 16, on folio 16 of the record containing 
all the evidence offered by the plaintiff) and referred to in Fact three of the 
unchallenged account of events in the appealed judgment; and be it said that 
the verbal note of 22/11/06 also referred to in the seventeenth and last Fact 
of the said account cannot be construed as contradicting the previous written 
reply, fi rstly because there is no indication of any rectifi cation of that previous 
response to the opposing party, despite this being a reply to a question from 
the plaintiff prompted by the said written reply. And besides this, the precise 
terms of that question, whose purpose was obviously to try and counteract the 
effects of the cited response, are not known; also, the terms of the said note 
are unclear in that even if the international organisation has concluded a spe-
cial agreement, that does not mean that it is exempted from the State’s general 
legislation on the subject; and on top of everything else, the document bears no 
legible signature nor indication of the department of the Ministry or the issuing 
offi cer, which minimum assurances of proper procedure are nevertheless present 
in the written reply previously received by the plaintiff.
In any case, whatever decision is arrived at by the courts is not affected by 
the opinion of the Administration or by the way in which the latter interprets the 
applicable regulations.
The Vienna Convention is not contradicted by the Headquarters Agreement 
concluded between Spain and the defendant international organisation, which 
makes no provision regarding the issue in this case – which be it said is only to 
be expected – and therefore the said Convention may be accepted as eminently 
applicable to the case as provided in art. 4.1 of the Civil Code even although 
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it does not involve an agreement with an actual State, given that it is in fact a 
matter of international relations with an independent supranational entity pos-
sessing its own legal personality which may by extension be properly treated in 
the same way as a State in all matters not otherwise specifi cally regulated, as 
one may fairly infer from the treatment afforded to the organisation’s Executive 
Director in art. 10.1 of the Agreement.
Having established the foregoing, we must then start with the declaration 
contained in article 41 of the Spanish Constitution, to the effect that the public 
Social Security system established in Spain is “for all citizens” and is created 
to guarantee them social care and benefi ts in situations of need, “especially in 
the event of unemployment”, which according to the ordinary implementing 
regulations introduced primordially by the Social Security Act (LGSS) means 
registration with the Social Security of any Spanish worker serving in Spain 
and contribution for all the contingencies covered by the system, as provided 
in arts 7, 12 and 15 of the said Act.
This then is the basis upon which to properly interpret the regulations 
applicable to the case, namely RD 317/1985 of 6 February, the Royal Decree 
dealing specifi cally with the international organisation defending in this action, 
which has headquarters in Spain. This regulation – unlike RD 2.805/1979 of 
7 November, which is cited in its preamble – is applicable solely to Spanish 
civil servants residing and serving in the national territory, without mentioning 
(and hence excluding) workers; the latter, who in all likelihood constitute only 
a minimal or very small group, or may even consist of one or two persons 
engaged in jobs like the plaintiff’s, obviously come under the general legislation 
since they also do not fall into the category of “private servants solely at the 
service of the Diplomatic Agent” referred to in art. 33 section 2 of the cited 
Vienna Convention as mentioned above, in respect of whom the said article 
excuses the Agent from complying with the social security provisions in force 
in the receiving State. Hence, this does not apply to the appellant. In short, 
her situation as a worker in the occupational category identifi ed in point one 
of the uncontested account of the facts in the appealed decision is governed by 
the general Spanish legislation on the subject, as cited above, and hence she is 
entitled to the benefi t here at issue.
According to art. 126 of the LGSS, liability for failure to affi liate or register 
the worker with the public insurance system lies entirely with the employer, 
albeit with respect to unemployment – unlike other social security benefi ts and 
as a special case – art. 220 of the Law invokes the principle that the manag-
ing entity is automatically responsible even in the event of failure to perform 
that obligation, “without prejudice to such action as may be taken against the 
infringing enterprise or to the latter’s liability for any benefi ts paid”. This is 
implemented in similar terms in art. 31 of RD 625/1985 of 2 April.




In favour of the appeal for reversal brought by Lourdes against the judgment 
delivered by Social Court 30 of Madrid, dated the twenty-eighth of March two 
thousand and seven, in the proceedings conducted before it at the instance of 
the appellant against the SERVICIO PÚBLICO DE EMPLEO ESTATAL and 
CONSEJO OLEÍCOLA INTERNACIONAL (COI), in a claim for unemploy-
ment benefi t. We therefore revoke the said decision and order the COI to pay 
the costs of the action in the terms provided by law, and we order the SPEE 
to advance payment of that benefi t as properly explained herein.”
V. THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Human rights and fundamental freedoms
a) Right to inviolability of the home
Judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Canary Islands of 22 June. Conten-
tious-Administrative Jurisdiction. Appeal. 
Appeal heard by Section Two of the Chamber for Contentious Administrative 
Proceedings of the Canary Islands, sitting at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, con-
ducted according to the special procedure for protection of the fundamental rights 
of the person before Contentious Administrative Court No. 1 of Las Palmas de 
Gran Canaria. 
“II. Legal Grounds
ONE. The object of the Contentious-Administrative appeal now before this 
Court, which was conducted by the Contentious-Administrative court under the 
special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights, or judicial protec-
tion as it is called in the new jurisdictional Act, was a plea for recognition 
of unlawful action by the Town Council of Galdar infringing the appellant’s 
fundamental rights to physical and moral integrity and to the inviolability of 
the home, in that on 10 de October 2005 a diesel engine was installed on a 
plot open to the air to supply electricity to the municipal offi ces situate at Calle 
Capitán Quesada no. 29 in Galdar, without the requisite classifi ed activity permit 
for installation and operation as provided in article 2.1 of the Public Entertain-
ment and Classifi ed Activities (Legal Regime) Act, Law 1/1998 of 8 January 
(LCAN 1998, 10 and 45), and without prior administrative authorisation for 
electricity generation as required by article 21.1 of the Electricity Sector Act, 
Law 54/1997 of 27 November (RCL 1997, 2821), and that it produced noise, 
vibrations, smells and fumes in the adjoining dwelling which is the home of 
the plaintiff (here the appellant).
The court of instance dismissed the plea, Ground Three of the judgment 
stating as regards the circumstances of the case:
“We would point out in the fi rst place that the object of this appeal is not 
to determine whether there is a permit for the installation concerned or whether 
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such a permit is mandatory, as that belongs to the sphere of ordinary legality 
and hence must be examined in Contentious-Administrative appeal no. 621/2005 
before Contentious-Administrative Court no. Three of the Province.
Therefore, in the present case what we have to determine is whether the 
engine concerned produces suffi cient noise and fumes to infringe fundamental 
rights to physical integrity and inviolability of the home. And in that respect 
the record of the proceedings shows no evidence to support such an infringe-
ment. On the one hand the writ of complaint was accompanied by a notarised 
declaration to the effect that there was noise coming from an adjoining plot and 
a smell of fumes, but without any expert report establishing the level of noise. 
On the other hand, the record (folio 1) contains a municipal technical report 
concluding that the noise produced by the engine blends into the general back-
ground noise and that it cannot be said that the engine could cause a nuisance 
through airborne noise”.
In short, the appeal was dismissed because the plaintiff did not furnish suffi cient 
evidence of the reality of the noise and nuisance reported nor that these were of 
suffi cient intensity to warrant an assumption of infringement of the fundamental 
rights whose protection was sought, albeit the First and Second Grounds do 
correctly explain the substance of the rights invoked and their scope, which is 
not limited to protection against material entrance in the actual home.
TWO. The fact is that few fundamental rights in our legal system have seen 
their scope so spectacularly expanded as the right to inviolability of the home, 
which in that sense has become a textbook example of what jurisprudence has 
come to call the “expansive force of fundamental rights”.
This development is not unconnected with a ruling by the European Court 
of Human Rights on the interpretation and application of article 8 of the Rome 
Convention of 4 Nov. 1950 (RCL 1979, 2421) on “Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms”, relating to the right of all persons to respect for 
their private and family life, their home and their correspondence, section 2 
reminding us that “There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others”.
That jurisprudence has made its way onto the Spanish statute book via article 
10.2 of the Spanish Constitution (RCL 1978, 2836) and has been accepted by 
the Constitutional Court in its interpretation of the scope of the right to invio-
lability of the home.
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 December 1994 
(TEDH 1994, 3) (López Ostra versus Spain) marked the starting-point for the 
reconsideration and evolution of the Spanish Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding the scope of the right to inviolability of the home, followed by the 
Courts of Justice, which are bound by the Constitutional Court’s interpretation 
of the norms enshrined in the Constitution.
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And precisely because the Constitution recognises what we call fundamen-
tal rights and public freedoms, with enhanced legal protection (internally via 
the special judicial procedure for protection of fundamental freedoms in the 
Contentious-Administrative sphere, and where appropriate through the consti-
tutional procedure of appeal for the protection of fundamental rights), a strong 
tendency has arisen for such intrusions to be considered seriously harmful 
when they affect a person in connection with his home, and to be viewed as 
unconstitutional violations of or offences against his right to privacy when this 
is disturbed by such inroads. Indeed, peaceful enjoyment of the right to privacy, 
and most particularly within the home and its environs, requires an environ-
ment that is immune to disturbances from the outside which one has no specifi c 
duty to tolerate, including excessive and persistent noises, even where these are 
produced by activities which are in principle legitimate but cease to be so when 
they overstep certain limits.
In this vein, the core of privacy/protection of the home has come to include 
the absence of nuisances in the form of fumes and smells on the grounds that 
these also constitute, or may constitute, an infringement of the fundamental 
rights protected by article 18 of our Constitution.
In the same vein, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 2 
Oct. 2001 (ECHR 2001, 567) (Hatton and others versus the United Kingdom) in 
connection with noise caused by air traffi c concluded that this infringed article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in that a fair balance was not 
struck between the economic well-being of the country and effective enjoyment 
by the plaintiffs of respect for their homes and their private and family lives.
Our Constitutional Court has been one of the movers in this doctrinal trend, 
inevitably so in view of article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, for the pur-
poses of which the Constitutional Court Judgment of 24 May 2001 warned that 
prolonged exposure to certain levels of noise that are objectively avoidable and 
unbearable merits the protection afforded to the fundamental right to personal 
and family privacy in the home insofar as these prevent or seriously hinder the 
free development of the personality, always provided that the injury or harm 
is caused by acts or omissions of public entities which can be blamed for the 
injury caused.
In short, at stake here is our right to lead our private lives without external 
disturbances or interferences which are avoidable and which we are under no 
obligation to bear. No-one has the right to prevent us from enjoying a minimum 
degree of peace and rest; and the public powers are actually duty-bound to assure 
our enjoyment of that right as far as the circumstances will permit”.
THREE. In this case, then, in view of the jurisprudence of the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court, this Chamber considers that there has been a clear and 
fl agrant infringement of a fundamental right, interpreted not only as the right 
to freedom from illegal entry but also as the right to repose, peace and quiet 
in the family home, irrespective of whether the nuisance is not excessively 
prolonged or the noise, smells and fumes may be judged bearable in terms of 
their intensity within a given space.
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The argument of the Administration, which is recorded in the judgment, is that 
because of the nature of the special proceedings it was not possible to discuss 
the legality of the installation there and that besides, it was not demonstrated 
that the noise could be considered unbearable in the sense of affecting personal 
physical or moral integrity or the inviolability of the home, adding furthermore 
that the engine was not installed on a permanent basis but was a temporary, 
emergency measure and in any case did not exceed the legal limits on emission 
of noise, gases or vibrations.
However, this Chamber considers that the installation, without any authorisa-
tion, necessarily creates a nuisance which the persons affected are not obliged 
to tolerate. For peaceful enjoyment of the right to privacy, and most particularly 
within the home and its environs, requires an environment that is immune to 
disturbances from the outside which one has no specifi c duty to tolerate, and such 
disturbances indubitably include persistent noises, and also fumes and smells.
In this case the activity was not legitimate – the Council explained that the 
lack of authorisation was due to the urgency and the temporary nature of the 
installation – and furthermore it produced, noises, fumes and smells that neither 
the plaintiff nor the other neighbours were under any obligation to tolerate. And 
if only for the fact that it was operated without any kind of authorisation or 
control and for the real production of noise and other nuisances, we may fairly 
conclude that its infringed the neighbours’ right to peace, quiet and repose in 
their own homes.
The argument that the issue of the legality of the installation cannot be 
addressed in the special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights is 
untenable in that the action was brought precisely under article 32 of the LJCA 
(RCL 1998, 1741) in order to preserve the rights and freedoms for whose pro-
tection the appeal was brought (art. 114.2 LJCA). Hence, the facts – that is the 
absence of any kind of legal authority for the installation and operation of the 
engine – provide the basis for the action brought, and it cannot be dismissed as 
an issue of ordinary legality. It might have been if this unlawful action – which 
has been proven and actually acknowledged – did not constitute a serious enough 
interference in the rights whose protection is sought, which is a basic or central 
issue in the chosen procedure.
FOUR. Having arrived at the heart of the debate, we fi nd that the technical 
report cited by the Administration as evidence that the noise was not intense 
enough to constitute an infringement of the right to privacy states that when the 
engine is stopped the noise level is 62.3 dB(A) and when it is running the level 
is 64.2 dB(A), from which it concludes that the noise of the engine merges into 
the background noise and hence it cannot be said to cause a nuisance through 
airborne noise.
However, that conclusion bears out the thesis that when the engine is run-
ning the noise to which the nearest neighbours are subjected is more intense, 
inasmuch as it rises from 62.3 dB(A) to 64.2 dB(A), and the noise is moreover 
continuous and prolonged, lasting from 8.00 to 15.00 hours from Monday to 
Friday and from 8.30 to 12.30 on Saturdays. And it should be remembered 
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that the right to privacy is infringed not only by the intensity but also by 
the prolongation or continuation of the noise, which can render it unbearable, 
producing a serious and reasonable likelihood that the right to personal repose, 
peace and quiet will be infringed.
As to the fumes, the technical report states that at the time of inspection 
these were little, with no sign of horizontal displacement; however, this is a 
partial and slanted conclusion in that it takes no account of so elementary a 
factor as the strength and direction of the wind, for which no technical quali-
fi cation is required.
And lastly, the report makes no mention of the smells, which constitute 
another possible infringement of the fundamental right to peace and quite in 
one’s own home.
For the rest, a private individual need not be required to demonstrate the 
intensity of a noise by means of a sound-level meter. Given evidence of unau-
thorised installation and the fact that it is being operated and produces noise, 
smells and fumes, it is up to the Administration, which installed the engine, to 
demonstrate that the nuisance does not exceed the limits of what is reasonable 
and normal – which limits will in principle be exceeded if the unauthorised 
engine is run only a few metres away from dwellings.
And fi nally as regards the notary’s report, the Notary may not be a techni-
cal expert, but he certainly can record objective facts for which no professional 
qualifi cation is required, including a) the smell of fumes and the noise perceptible 
before reaching number 16 in Calle El Moral; and b) noise and the smell of 
fumes inside the dwelling, in a bedroom, in the kitchen and on the roof.
This is a simple piece of testimony, but furnished by a public commissioner 
for oaths, whose personal perception may be relied upon as regards the fact and 
the extent of the nuisance caused by the installation when in operation. 
In short, the important point is that there were noises, smells and other 
nuisances which the citizen is not obliged to tolerate, and it has been demon-
strated that the engine was installed a scant few metres from the dwelling, that 
the engine was installed with no regard whatsoever for proper procedure, and 
that the installation was not dismantled or halted until ordered by a court as 
a provisional measure, from which it follows that for as long as it lasted the 
administrative action infringed the plaintiff’s right to inviolability of her home 
and to personal and family privacy, and therefore we are obliged to uphold her 
plea for the cessation of the unlawful action in order to preserve the rights that 
have been infringed.
FIVE. As for the acknowledgement of an entitlement to compensation for 
pain and suffering as an individualised legal situation, admittedly the supporting 
evidence is not suffi cient to accredit pain and suffering to the extent claimed. 
However, the very fact and existence of the noise and other nuisances is objec-
tive evidence of suffering that must be remedied, and this Chamber estimates 
the monetary value of such remedy at seven thousand euros, which it consid-
ers a reasonable sum, suffi cient to palliate the pain and suffering, which was 
temporary.
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The expansive force of fundamental rights should be accompanied by an 
expansive force in the compensation for pain and suffering; but the judgment 
cannot be accepted as the sole remedy for the injury, for otherwise the court’s 
decision would be no more than a formal declaration lacking any material force 
to repair the injury to the infringed right.
At the same time, while the assessment of pain and suffering is always highly 
subjective, this Chamber takes the view that the nuisance proven in this case 
ought to carry compensation commensurate with the circumstances, particularly 
the duration of the noise, which only ceased when the court ordered provisional 
measures (and not on the initiative of the Town Council) – but it did cease, and 
hence the infringement of the right concerned was not excessively prolonged. 
It is therefore our opinion that the compensation is commensurate with the fact 
that the noise and other nuisances went on for many hours during the day, in 
which circumstances the qualitative intensity of the nuisance would necessarily 
increase, inevitably producing nervousness, disquiet, confusion and a sense of 
insecurity in the inhabitant of a nearby dwelling faced with a new and unexpected 
situation which led – not to say obliged – her to take legal action.
SIX. This Chamber therefore revokes the appealed judgment and upholds the 
Contentious-Administrative appeal and recognises, for the particular purposes 
of this individual case, the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation for pain and 
suffering in the amount stated in the foregoing Ground. There is no award of 
costs for successful appeals of this kind (art. 139.2 LJCA [RCL 1998, 1741], 
a sensu contrario), and there is no award of costs for the original proceedings 
absent rash or procedurally improper conduct in the defendant Administration 
(art. 131.1 LJCA).
In light of the articles cited above and other generally applicable consider-
ations
III. We Find
In favour of the appeal brought by Procurator Ángel Colina Gómez in the
name and on behalf of Eva against the judgment of Number One Contentious-
Administrative Court of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria as mentioned in Plea 
the First, which we hereby revoke, and in its stead we declare admissible the 
Contentious-Administrative appeal brought and we acknowledge that in install-
ing and operating an engine to supply electricity the local authority has acted 
in a way that infringes the plaintiff’s fundamental rights to personal and family 
privacy and to inviolability of the home, and we recognise, for the particular 
purposes of this individual case, the plaintiff ’s entitlement to compensation of 
seven thousand euros for pain and suffering.
There is no award of costs for the original proceedings or the appeal.
This our judgment, certifi cation of which shall be appended to the Chamber’s 
roll, we pronounce, order and sign”.
b) Right of asylum
STS of 25 October 2007. Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. Appeal in Cas-
sation 1943/2004
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On 01/10/2003 the Chamber for Contentious Administrative Proceedings of the 
National High Court – Section One – pronounced Judgment dismissing the appeal 
brought against a Decision by the Ministry of the Interior, dated 31/01/2002, 
refusing to admit the appellant’s application for asylum for consideration. The 
Supreme Court declared that there was a case for the appeal in cassation brought 
by the appellant, set aside the challenged Judgment and upheld the contentious-
administrative appeal.
“Legal Grounds
ONE. The judgment here appealed dismissed the Contentious-Administrative 
appeal brought by Armando, a Cuban national, against a denial by the Ministry 
of the Interior dated 31 January 2002 following re-examination of a prior refusal 
to admit his asylum application for consideration, dated 29 January 2002, citing 
the circumstance contemplated in article 5.6 (b) of Law 5/84 of 26 March (RCL 
1984, 843) as amended by Law 9/94 (RCL 1994, 1420, 1556).
TWO. The original judgment records the story told by the appellant when 
applying for asylum and when requesting re-examination, details the Administra-
tion’s grounds for refusal to admit the application for consideration and explains 
why the court considers that the decision not to admit the asylum application 
for consideration was correct and lawful. Specifi cally, the said Judgment offers 
the following legal grounds:
“ONE. In order to settle this dispute, the following facts need to be consid-
ered:
1. The appellant, a Cuban national, founds his application on the following
account: When his uncle applied for asylum, pressure was put on his family. 
When “Che’s” remains were brought home, the house was searched. He has 
never been imprisoned, although he was detained for two or three hours.
2. The draft decision states that this case does not qualify for asylum. The
UNHCR reported that the application ought not to be admitted, citing art. 5.6.b) 
(RCL 1984, 843).
3. The application was denied under art. 5.6.b).
4. Upon re-examination the appellant stated that some of the documents were
with the US embassy in Cuba; that members of his family had travelled to the 
USA, leaving behind a very tense situation; and that his intention was to leave 
the country and rejoin his family. His departure was delayed indefi nitely, and 
then began a series of threats, detentions, blackmail and summonses. In October 
2002 he attempted to leave the country but was detained in immigration on the 
grounds of political problems and prevented from boarding the aeroplane. He 
belongs to the Asociación Maseístas por la Dignidad (a human rights associa-
tion; he possesses a membership card, but it is in Cuba). He has also worked 
with a movement called Carlos Manuel de la Peña.
5. The UNHCR reported that it saw no reason to alter its opinion against
admission of the application. The request was denied upon re-examination.
TWO. According to art. 5.6.b) of Law 5/1984 (RCL 1984, 843) as amended 
by Law 9/1994 (RCL 1994, 1420, 1556), at the proposal of the body in charge 
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of inquiries and after a hearing of the UNHCR, the Minister may, in a rea-
soned decision, resolve not to admit an asylum application for consideration 
where the applicant fails to cite any of the conditions required for recognition 
of refugee status. This only happens when the conditions stipulated in art. 3 
of the Law arise.
According to the doctrine, for refugee status as defi ned in the Geneva Conven-
tion to be recognised, the following must be demonstrated: a) that the applicant 
is a foreign national or possesses no nationality; b) that he is genuinely at risk 
or has well-founded reasons to fear so; c) the possibility of coming to harm is 
due to the lack of State protection when there is persecution; d) that he has a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and e) that none 
of the reasons stipulated in law for cessation or exclusion arise. In this case 
it will be helpful to clarify the meaning of the term “persecution”; it means 
systematic conduct tending to cause harm to life or rights inherent to personal 
dignity and directed at an individual or a group, for reasons or motives of race, 
nationality, belonging to a particular social group, or political opinions. For the 
rest, it is up to the foreign applicant to furnish details of the facts on which 
his application is founded.
And in fact the appellant’s story does not support the assertion that he has 
been the object of persecution as defi ned above. All this is not to deny “the 
notorious severity of the political system in Cuba” – STS of 28 February 1989 
(RJ 1989, 1164). But the fact that he left the country with a passport and 
without any diffi culty clearly suggests the absence of persecution of the kind 
necessary to qualify for asylum – STS of 18 September 2001 (RJ 2001, 9172), 
27 January 1997 (RJ 1997, 267), 1 April 1995 (RJ 1995, 3169), 23 June 1994, 
8 November 1993 (RJ 1993, 8607), 4 October 1993 (RJ 1993, 7208) and 4 
December 1987(RJ 1987, 9385). So substantial an alteration of the story at the 
time of re-examination is not credible”.
THREE. The applicant brought an appeal in cassation against this judgment, 
setting out one sole reason for challenging it, under article 88.1.d) of the Juris-
diction Act (RCL 1998, 1741), claiming infringement of article 3 and 8 of the 
Asylum Act (RCL 1984, 843) in that, the appellant asserts, he did in fact suffer 
genuine persecution for political reasons in his country of origin.
FOUR. We mean to uphold the appeal in cassation.
Be it said in the fi rst place that the citation of articles 3 and 8 of the Asylum 
Act (RCL 1984, 843) is valid in cassation even although what is challenged 
is refusal to consider an application, for as we have repeatedly said, refusal to 
admit an application for consideration by reason of the circumstances set out 
in art. 5.6.b) of the Asylum Act is also by extension an infringement of that 
provision, and anyone claiming infringement of the said article as it relates to 
the granting of asylum is implicitly also claiming infringement of the rule gov-
erning admission for consideration. And article 5.6.b) of Law 5/84 as amended 
by Law 9/94 (RCL 1994, 1420, 1556) has in fact been infringed.
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The rule contained in article 5.6.b) allows for a decision not to admit an 
asylum application for consideration when the application fails to cite any of the 
circumstances required for recognition of refugee status; but that is not the case, 
for when he fi rst applied for asylum, and more insistently at the re-examination 
stage, the applicant did claim persecution for political reasons, that is reasons 
that may serve for the recognition of refugee status (articles 1.A.2 of the 1951 
Geneva Convention [RCL 1978, 2290, 2464], 1 of the 1967 New York Protocol 
and 3.1 of Law 5/1984).
The original judgment dismissed the story as related at the time of re-examina-
tion as lacking credibility in that it differed from the story as originally related 
upon applying for asylum; but when we come down to it the two versions are 
not so divergent given that in the fi rst version the applicant related the problems 
that he had encountered because a relative had applied for asylum, describing a 
house search and detention. In any event the claim by the Chamber at instance 
that the story as related on re-examination lacked credibility is irrelevant to the 
reason for refusal adduced by the Administration, which has nothing to do with 
how plausible the story was.
For that reason, the lack of precision in the application and the doubts that 
arise as to whether or not there was actual persecution cannot be resolved by 
a refusal to consider the asylum application; to the contrary, they can only be 
settled by processing the application and then deciding whether or not a grant 
of asylum is warranted. This follows quite clearly from articles 17 and 18 of 
the Regulation implementing Law 5/1984, approved by Royal Decree 203/1995 
(RCL 1995, 741), whereby the reasons for refusal to consider an application 
must be manifest (as per article 17 referring to applications not made at a 
frontier) or must be manifest and unchallengeable (as per article 18 referring 
to applications made at a frontier, as in the present case).
FIVE. In accordance with article 139 of the Jurisdiction Act (RCL 1998, 
1741), there is no reason to make any special award of costs, either at the 
earlier instance or at this cassation stage.
And therefore, in the name of HM the King and in exercise of the power 
emanating from the people and vouchsafed us by the Constitution, 
We Find
That appeal in cassation no. 1943/2004 brought by Armando against judg-
ment no. 252/02 delivered on 1 October 2003 (JUR 2004, 53465) by Section 
1 of the Chamber for Contentious Administrative Proceedings of the National 
High Court is warranted; and therefore:
1. We uphold the contentious-administrative appeal brought by Armando
against the refusal by the Ministry of the Interior, dated of 31 January 2002, 
to reconsider the previous Decision of 29 January 2002 refusing to admit his 
asylum application for consideration, and we hereby set aside both decisions 
as unlawful.
2. We recognise the right of Armando to have his application for asylum
admitted for consideration. And
3. We make no special award of costs, either at the earlier instance or in
this appeal in cassation”.
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